WALTER HERBERT RICE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman (Doc. # 13), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) has expired, hereby
Accordingly, it is hereby
Michael J. Newman, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative
Plaintiff filed for DIB on February 1, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of August 31, 2010. PageID 36. Plaintiff claims disability as a result of a number of impairments including, inter alia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD") and mild lumbar degenerative disc disease. PageID 38.
After initial denial of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Amelia Lombardo on August 29, 2012. PageID 52. The ALT issued a written decision thereafter finding Plaintiff not disabled. PageID 45. Specifically, the ALJ's findings were as follows:
PageID 38-45.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the
In her decision, the ALJ set forth a detailed recitation of the underlying medical evidence in this case. PageID 38-44. Plaintiff, in her Statement of Errors, sets forth a detailed summary of the record evidence. PageID 345-51. The Commissioner presents no specific objection to Plaintiff's summary and defers to the ALJ's recitation of the relevant medical evidence. PageID 363. Except as otherwise noted in this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned incorporates Plaintiffs summary and the ALJ's recitation of the evidence.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir.2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.1978).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.2001). Thus, the ALJ has a "`zone of choice' within which he [or she] can act without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir.2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Miller v. Comer of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is disabled under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997).
In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in: (1) failing to properly weigh the opinion of Joseph Payton, D.C., her treating chiropractor;
At Step Two of the sequential review process, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs COPD and lumbar disc disease were "severe" impairments under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). PageID 38. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs mental impairments were not severe because, after considering the "four broad functional areas... known as the `paragraph B' criteria[,]" she determined Plaintiffs "mental impairments cause no more than `mild' limitation in any of the first three functional areas" [i.e., activities of daily living; social functioning; and concentration, persistence, and pace], and because there were no extended episodes of decompensation. PageID 38-39.
Where, as here, the ALJ finds at Step Two that a claimant suffers from at least one severe impairment, the ALJ is required to consider the limiting effects of all impairments — including limitations — resulting from non-severe impairments — when determining the claimant's RFC at
Further, "a Step Two analysis is distinct from the ALJ's obligation to consider the impact of Plaintiffs non-severe impairments in addition to and in conjunction with Plaintiffs severe impairments in assessing Plaintiff's RFC." Singleton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-140, 2015 WL 2381162, at *3 (S.D.Ohio May 19, 2015) (quoting Katona, 2015 WL 871617, at *6). Here, the ALJ acknowledged that the Step Two determination is distinct from an RFC determination by stating that:
PageID 39.
Despite such acknowledgment, however, the ALJ nevertheless included no limitations arising from Plaintiffs mental impairments simply "because ... the claimant's depression causes no more than mild impairment in the `paragraph B' criteria[.]" Id. In other words, the ALJ found no limitations arising from Plaintiffs mental impairments simply because those impairments were not severe. Id. Such conclusion is error because it conflates the distinct steps of the sequential review process and fails to reasonably explain the absence of limitations arising from Plaintiffs mental impairments. This error is not harmless. See Meadows, 2008 WL 4911243, at *13.
Accordingly, because the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiffs mental impairments in determining her RFC, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's non-disability finding should be reversed.
When, as here, the ALJ's non-disability determination is unsupported by substantial evidence, the Court must determine whether to reverse and remand the matter for rehearing or to reverse and order the award of benefits. The Court has authority to affirm, modify or reverse the Commissioner's decision "with or without remanding the cause for rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). Generally, benefits may be awarded immediately "only if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiffs entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human, Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1994); see also Abbott
Here, remand for further proceedings is necessary so that the ALJ can properly evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments — separately or in conjunction with her other impairments — in determining her RFC, and assess Plaintiff's disability status anew.